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PRINCIPLES FOR PASSION KILLING: AN EVOLUTIONARY
SOLUTION TO MANSLAUGHTER MITIGATION†
ABSTRACT
The law recognizes the frailty of human nature by mitigating murder to
manslaughter when committed in the heat of passion or under extreme
emotional disturbance. Evolutionary analysis entails the scientific study of the
principles of human nature. Yet, the law’s understanding of human nature is
not congruent with evolutionary analysis. To be legally provoked under
common law for manslaughter mitigation, a homicide must be in response to
one of four kinds of provocation: adultery, mutual combat, false arrest, and
violent assault. And under adultery, only sexual infidelity counts. Sexual
infidelity is not the only type of infidelity that can push a person into a
homicidal rage, and while American jurisdictions have started moving away
from the rigid categories, sexual infidelity remains a paradigmatic approach
for mitigation. The Model Penal Code attempted to make the law more
contextual, but it created a new series of adjudications that are expansive and
also incongruent with evolutionary analysis.
This Comment addresses the incongruence of both the common law and the
Model Penal Code—which produce gender disparity in manslaughter
doctrine—with evolutionary analysis. By exploring why sexual infidelity would
provoke passion sufficient for homicidal rage, the Comment develops a
mitigating standard for adultery that is consistent with evolutionary analysis
and notions of gender equality. It uses evolutionary analysis to determine
which universally recognizable forms of jealousy and related passion-laden
mental states should also be sufficient provocation to deserve that same
mitigation.
The passionate response to sexual infidelity is just one adaptive solution to
a threat against a male’s reproductive fitness. However, in flagrante delicto
does not take the passion-invoking circumstances of the female end of the same
evolutionary spectrum into account. Our ancestral mothers faced a different
set of evolutionary challenges against their reproductive fitness for which they

† This Comment received the 2012 Myron Penn Laughlin Award for Excellence in Legal Research and
Writing.
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have evolved different impassioned—and potentially deadly—responses. These
passions should be incorporated into manslaughter doctrine.
For the law to apply fairly and mitigate for the frailty of human nature, it
must take the actual design of the mind seriously. This Comment argues for a
better understanding of human nature in manslaughter mitigation that will
result in more just adjudications for both men and women.
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INTRODUCTION
[T]he law, out of indulgence to the frailty of human nature, or rather,
in recognition of the laws upon which human nature is
constituted . . . regards [manslaughter] as of a less heinous
1
character . . . .
To deprive others of their life is one of the most effective means of
2
increasing one’s own fitness.

Humans kill because we love.3 It is an age-old story familiar to the human
race, colloquially deemed a “crime of passion.” Manslaughter mitigation
recognizes this frailty of human nature that results in passion killing.4 The law
takes what would otherwise be murder and reduces the crime itself to a lesser
one, indicating the society’s belief that this dynamic part of humanity cannot
be as morally culpable.5 While there were a limited number of ways to be
legally provoked under the traditional common law,6 the quintessential
provocation has often been thought to be in flagrante delicto—the sudden, inperson discovery of one’s romantic partner engaging in sexual activity with
someone else.7 While many American jurisdictions have moved away from the

1

Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 219 (1862).
JOSEPH LOPREATO, HUMAN NATURE AND BIOCULTURAL ETHICS 137–38 (1984).
3 Cf. Margo I. Wilson & Martin Daly, Who Kills Whom in Spouse Killings? On the Exceptional Sex
Ratio of Spousal Homicides in the United States, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 189, 189 (1992) (“During the 10 years
from 1976 to 1985, a total of 18,417 people are estimated to have been killed by their spouses in the United
States.”).
4 See Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481, 510 (1898) (“The law, in recognition of the frailty of
human nature, regards a homicide committed under the influence of sudden passion, or in hot blood produced
by adequate cause, and before a reasonable time has elapsed for the blood to cool, as an offen[s]e of a less
heinous character than murder.”); Maher, 10 Mich. at 219 (“[T]he law, out of indulgence to the frailty of
human nature, or rather, in recognition of the laws upon which human nature is constituted . . . regards the
offense as of a less heinous character . . . .”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a), at 55 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980) (explaining that the mitigation is a “concession to human weakness” and that “one
who kills in response to certain provoking events should be regarded as demonstrating a significantly different
character deficiency than one who kills in their absence”).
5 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a), at 54 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
6 Note, Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation: The Reasonableness of the Reasonable Man,
106 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1023–24 (1958) (enumerating the “nineteenth century four”). When voluntary
manslaughter was codified in American jurisdictions, almost all states referred to the common law scheme for
guidance in adjudication. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 2, at 45 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980). Texas was the only state that did not have a manslaughter offense. Id. at 45 n.6.
7 See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 72 (1992); Susan D. Rozelle, Controlling Passion: Adultery and the
Provocation Defense, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 197, 198–99 (2005).
2
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rigidity of categorical approach,8 sexual infidelity remains a paradigmatic
approach to manslaughter mitigation.9 Note this carnal requirement: the
common law sanctions manslaughter for the sudden discovery of sexual
infidelity, leaving impassioned homicide that results from non-sexual infidelity
subject to the laws of murder and sympathies of jurors.
In reality, though, sexual misconduct is not the only kind of iniquitous love
affair that causes intense passions.10 This in flagrante delicto category does not
seem to describe the range of passions that we colloquially find to be
understandable triggers for a crime of passion.11 Indeed, in some particularly
sympathetic circumstances, courts have innovated to mete out a just verdict
around the rigid law.12
The common law’s inflexibility has been addressed by the American Law
Institute and legal scholarship.13 The Model Penal Code disbands this rigidity

8

SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 395 (8th ed.
2007) (“[A] minority view[] departs from the conventional common law position that only a few particular
circumstances . . . can serve as legally adequate provocation.”); see, e.g., Maher, 10 Mich. at 222–23 (“The
law can not with justice assume, by the light of past decisions, to catalogue all the various facts and
combinations of facts which shall be held to constitute reasonable or adequate provocation. . . . Provocations
will be given without reference to any previous model, and the passions they excite will not consult the
precedents.”).
9 Rozelle, supra note 7, at 199.
10 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a), at 61 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (“By
eliminating any reference to provocation in the ordinary sense of improper conduct by the deceased, the Model
Code avoids arbitrary exclusion of some circumstances that may justify reducing murder to manslaughter.”).
11 Cf. Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106
YALE L.J. 1331, 1332 (1997) (suggesting that the colloquial understanding of a crime of passion is “the stuff of
sordid affairs and bed side confrontations”).
12 See, e.g., ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 184–88 (The Feminist Press 2009) (1980).
13 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a), at 55 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980)
(explaining that the extreme emotional disturbance mitigation is a “concession to human weakness” and that
“one who kills in response to certain provoking events should be regarded as demonstrating a significantly
different character deficiency than one who kills in their absence”); Wendy Keller, Disparate Treatment of
Spouse Murder Defendants, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 255, 282–83 (1996) (discussing the
disparate treatment of male and female killers based on a male-oriented legal structure and arguing to address
female characteristics in killing); Nourse, supra note 11, at 1392–94 (arguing for a restructuring of
manslaughter doctrine based on “warranted excuse[s]”); Rozelle, supra note 7, at 232–33 (concluding that
manslaughter is inherently a justification defense and, thus, the mitigation should not apply to cases of
infidelity at all because there is no threat against the defendant that justifies the use of force); Antonia Elise
Miller, Note, Inherent (Gender) Unreasonableness of the Concept of Reasonableness in the Context of
Manslaughter Committed in the Heat of Passion, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 249, 272–75 (2010)
[hereinafter Miller, Inherent (Gender) Unreasonableness] (arguing to reformulate manslaughter mitigation to
better understand female violence and remedy gender bias in the reasonable person standard); Emily L. Miller,
Comment, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J.
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by reformulating manslaughter under the idea of “extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.”14 Under this standard, homicides that occur while the killer is
under any extreme emotional disturbance can be mitigated to manslaughter as
long as the jury finds it “reasonable” from the defendant’s perspective.15 This
enormous amount of trial court discretion has led to interesting new
developments that move manslaughter law to misguided and counterproductive—indeed, damaging—decisions.16
Feminists have criticized manslaughter doctrine for its disparate impact on
women, both in common law and Model Penal Code jurisdictions.17 Most
scholarly solutions to this manslaughter problem involve a sociological or
cultural perspective to remedy its apparent incompleteness.18 This Comment
joins that conversation and moves it from a societal critique to an evolutionary
standard based on predictability.
To take the “frailty of human nature”19 seriously as a legal value, the law
must look at the design of the human mind rather than current social beliefs or
trends. This Comment concludes that a provocation standard that incorporates
evolutionary analysis will better tailor manslaughter mitigation to apply to
homicide in a more just and systematic way.20 It explores what that frailty in
passion over sexual infidelity is, expands upon it, and reformulates the doctrine
in a gender-neutral way. Or, in the words of the Michigan Supreme Court as
early as 1862, the Comment uses evolutionary principles to explore “the laws
upon which human nature is constituted”21 to determine how manslaughter in
cases of infidelity should be adjudicated. It concludes that the fault in
manslaughter doctrine is the failure to account for evolutionary threats against

665, 692–93 (2001) [hereinafter Miller, (Wo)manslaughter] (arguing to abolish the heat of passion defense to
better protect the rights of women).
14 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
15 Id.
16 See infra Part I.B.
17 See infra Part I.A–B.
18 See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 11, at 1392–94 (arguing for a solution based on social beliefs); James J.
Sing, Note, Culture as Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and Culture in the Criminal Law,
108 YALE L.J. 1845 (1999); see infra Part I.C.
19 Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481, 510 (1898) (“The law, in recognition of the frailty of human
nature, regards a homicide committed under the influence of sudden passion, or in hot blood produced by
adequate cause, and before a reasonable time has elapsed for the blood to cool, as an offen[s]e of a less
heinous character than murder.”).
20 As discussed below, sexual infidelity is only one threat against a human’s reproductive fitness. From
an evolutionary perspective, it is more relevant to men than to women. See infra Part II.B–C.
21 Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 219 (1862).
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women; the law has sought to apply an evolutionarily masculine perspective to
feminine responses, which is inappropriate.22 The evolutionary perspective
provides a solution that is mostly free of social and cultural disparities because
it provides a standard relevant to all humans, regardless of those factors. If the
law mitigates for a certain type of threat against reproductive fitness, it must do
so for all threats—not simply those most applicable to men.
Part I of this Comment describes the general landscape of manslaughter
mitigation, discussing the common law, the Model Penal Code, and alternative
solutions to the disparate impact of the law. Part II juxtaposes the legal
landscape with evolutionary theory to demonstrate the underlying
incongruence between the law and human nature.23 After exposing the
insufficiency of previous applications of the law, Part III weaves evolutionary
principles into manslaughter doctrine and explains how this approach can
begin to rid the doctrine of its disparate impact on women.
I. UNFAIR AND UNWIELDY MANSLAUGHTER
There are two paradigmatic approaches in the United States to reduce a
homicide from murder to manslaughter: the common law’s adequate
provocation standard and the MPC’s extreme emotional disturbance standard.24
Each scheme produces different results,25 and this Comment concludes that
each is inappropriate to mete out just results for all killers impassioned over
infidelity and related emotions. This Part explores the boundaries of
manslaughter mitigation to give an overview of the current state of the
doctrine.
Section A discusses how traditional manslaughter doctrine and its modern
trend have excluded alternative forms of threats against one’s reproductive
fitness from being considered as sufficient provocation. Section B examines
22 See infra Part II (explaining the relevant evolutionary differences between men and women as well as
describing how displaying intense passions over sexual infidelity is an evolutionarily masculine response).
23 “Feminine passions” will be used as a term to describe passions derived from emotional infidelity. In
turn, “masculine passions” will be used to describe passion or distress evoked by sexual infidelity. The use of
these terms is not meant to strictly categorize all women in one way and all men in another way, but rather as a
convenient shorthand to describe rather complicated phenomena. The author readily admits that men and
women can be provoked into passion and distress for many reasons and cross the sexual categories described
by evolutionary psychology. This area of psychology seeks to understand general trends in adaptive behavior
that will be significantly predictable rather than absolute rules to be followed by each sex.
24 Miller, Inherent (Gender) Unreasonableness, supra note 13, at 259 (explaining the different
approaches in the common law and the Model Penal Code).
25 Id.

BROUSSARD PROOFS1

2012]

10/31/2012 7:49 AM

PRINCIPLES FOR PASSION KILLING

185

the Model Penal Code’s approach to manslaughter under extreme emotional
disturbance and how it has developed into an expansive definition of
manslaughter. Section C looks at alternative ways the disparity in the law has
been addressed, both through adjudications and scholarly critiques and
solutions.
A. The Common Law: In Flagrante Delicto and Its Limited Applicability
At traditional common law, heat of passion manslaughter is not available to
mitigate except for a few rigid categories, requiring the court to innovate to
mete out justice in particularly sympathetic circumstances.26 And the law has
not applied to women in any meaningful way for a number of reasons.27 The
primary reason advanced by many feminist legal theorists is the male bias in
the law developed by the imbalance of status between men and women.28 This
Comment agrees with the assertion that the “reasonable woman” never figured
into the “reasonable person” standard at the time,29 and it argues evolutionary
principles can remedy this disparity.30
In common law jurisdictions, provocation manslaughter has two prongs
that must be satisfied for the mitigation to apply—the heat of passion
requirement and the legally sufficient provocation requirement.31 The heat of
passion prong is a test that combines the following subjective and objective
elements:
1. The defendant must have been in the heat of passion.
2. A reasonable person would also have been in the heat of passion.

26 See Russell D. Covey, Temporary Insanity: The Strange Life and Times of the Perfect Defense, 91
B.U. L. REV. 1597, 1642–43 (2011) (outlining the use of temporary insanity as a way to avoid murder
convictions for homicides convicted in extreme passions).
27 See Miller, (Wo)manslaughter, supra note 13, at 671–74 (explaining that heat of passion manslaughter
mitigation developed out of women’s societal roles and the law’s view of wives as the property of their
husbands); Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter
and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1689–92 (1986) (explaining that women have rarely been
the defendants in manslaughter cases and that it is not surprising due to their status in the development of this
law).
28 See, e.g., Miller, Inherent (Gender) Unreasonableness, supra note 13, at 253–56; Taylor, supra note
27, at 1689–92.
29 Taylor, supra note 27, at 1690–91.
30 See infra Part III.
31 Mitchell N. Berman & Ian P. Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as Partial Justification and Partial
Excuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1040 (2011) (explaining the requirements of manslaughter mitigation
at common law).
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3. The defendant must not have cooled down.
4. A reasonable person would not have cooled down.32
Note that the test is not that the passion caused the individual to commit
homicide; the ordinary person does not kill.33 Rather, the ordinary person’s
sensibilities are so affected by passion that homicide becomes a potential
solution.34
Through the second prong—legally sufficient provocation—the common
law limits the scope of what qualifies to provoke a heat of passion to certain
categorical circumstances.35 The categories, sometimes referred to as the
“nineteenth century four,”36 are adultery, mutual combat, false arrest, and
violent assault.37 However, some common law jurisdictions have moved away
from this rigidity and permitted the reasonable person standard to satisfy
adequate provocation.38 These jurisdictions—except Maryland39—allow in
flagrante delicto to serve as a paradigmatic category for sufficient
provocation.40
To claim manslaughter based on a passionate response to adultery, the
defendant would have to experience the sudden, visual discovery of her spouse
or lover engaging in sexual activity with a paramour.41 The common law does
not allow mere words to serve as adequate provocation;42 although some
jurisdictions have modified this law, traditional states require the defendant to
actually witness the act of sexual infidelity.43
One major criticism of mitigation for homicides committed in flagrante
delicto is that it perpetuates harmful gender stereotypes.44 The notion here is
that manslaughter privileges a type of homicide committed most frequently by

32

See id. at 1041 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 777 (4th ed. 2003)).
See id.
34 See id.
35 Rozelle, supra note 7, at 198–99.
36 Note, supra note 6, at 1023–24.
37 Nourse, supra note 11, at 1341.
38 KADISH ET AL., supra note 8, at 395 (“[A] minority view[] departs from the conventional common law
position that only a few particular circumstances . . . can serve as legally adequate provocation.”).
39 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-207(b) (LexisNexis 2012).
40 Rozelle, supra note 7, at 199.
41 Rozelle, supra note 7, at 198–99 & 199 n.7.
42 See Nourse, supra note 11, at 1342 & n.68.
43 Id.
44 Miller, (Wo)manslaughter, supra note 13, at 686.
33
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men: a husband killing his spouse over sexual misconduct.45 In flagrante
delicto reinforces gender stereotypes of male aggression and subordinates
women by allowing this kind of crime to be recognized in the law as less
heinous.46 Interestingly enough, the evolutionary perspective makes a similar
criticism, albeit for different reasons. As discussed below,47 this Comment
argues that we cannot mitigate for one gender’s mental frailties without
mitigating for the other gender’s as well, and, as illustrated through
evolutionary analysis, in flagrante delicto is an incomplete category that does
not include the female perspective.
Take the case of Mary Moriarty and John Shehan as an example of in
flagrante delicto’s limits.48 In 1850, Shehan asked Moriarty to marry him, but
he constantly procrastinated initiating wedding plans.49 Even after Moriarty
became pregnant with his child, bore the child, and witnessed the child’s death,
he continued to string her along without actually planning the marriage.50 After
significant time and events passed and they finally began planning the
wedding,51 Moriarty became pregnant again.52 Upon discovering this fact
Shehan told Moriarty that he did not intend to marry her anymore.53 She tried
to persuade him otherwise, but he would not have it.54 In a desperate and
passionate response to this sudden discovery of abandonment, Moriarty
stabbed him twice in the chest, killing him.55 As discussed below, this
impassioned response to seduction and abandonment is a predictable part of
human nature under evolutionary analysis, but falls outside of any mitigating
circumstances.
Due to the limits of in flagrante delicto, manslaughter could not apply.56
The defense attorney for Moriarty asked the jury to apply an unwritten law—

45

Id. at 667.
See id. at 686.
47 See infra Part III.B.
48 JONES, supra note 12, at 184.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. During this lapse in time, Moriarty lost her job and began working and living in the United States
Hotel in Memphis. Shehan skipped town on a drinking spree. Upon his return to Memphis, he proposed again
to Moriarty and borrowed money from her to pay his bills. Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See Rozelle, supra note 7, at 198–99 (explaining the categories that homicides must fall within for
mitigation to apply).
46
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emphasizing that it was the jury’s duty to return a “true verdict.”57 To kill this
seducer was no crime; Moriarty delivered “divine retribution” against an evil
man who had seduced her.58 Because she was morally justified, there could be
no murder.59 The jury of men, in the mid-eighteen hundreds, “set aside the
laws written in books, and by following the laws written upon the breast of
men found Mary Moriarty not guilty.”60 The jury determined these
circumstances to be particularly sympathetic and grievous and handed down
what it believed to be a fair judgment outside of the rigid heat of passion
manslaughter doctrine.61 The achievement of justice required a persuasive
attorney and sympathetic jury rather than equal respect and recognition in the
law.
The American Law Institute jettisoned the rigid categorical approach in the
MPC.62 The ALI found this rigid approach to mitigation inappropriate because
it does not include all the circumstances in which a reasonable person could be
pushed into homicidal passion.63 In the case of Moriarty, it is likely that the
jury could have found a middle ground between justice and mercy.64
B. The Model Penal Code: Extreme Emotional Disturbance and Its Wide
Application
The American Law Institute set out to reform American criminal law and,
in doing so, completely reformulated manslaughter doctrine to reflect a more
liberal approach that is context-specific.65 The MPC discarded the traditional
concept of legally sufficient provocation and replaced the scheme with
“extreme . . . emotional disturbance.”66 The relevant part reads as follows:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:
57 JONES, supra note 12, at 187–88 (emphasis omitted). For a discussion on the “unwritten law,” see infra
Part I.C.
58 JONES, supra note 12, at 187–88.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 See id. For an interesting assertion that this method for exonerating women outside of the design of the
law was actually more beneficial to women at the time, see Carolyn B. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide: Gender
and Crime Control, 1880–1920, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 101, 176–78 (2006).
62 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
63 Id. § 210.3 cmt. 5, at 61.
64 Compare JONES, supra note 12, at 187–88 (going outside the law to find Moriarty not guilty), with
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (supporting a reasonable
person standard).
65 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5, at 61 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
66 Id. § 210.3(1)(b).
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....
(b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or
excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall
be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s
67
situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.

The purpose of the reform was to apply mitigation in any circumstance causing
an extreme emotional disturbance that an ordinary person would find
reasonable given the defendant’s perspective.68 The law became much more
subjective and context-specific, and the scope of mitigating circumstances
expanded considerably after states adopted this language.69 The extension of
possible mitigating circumstances, at first glance, seems to have the potential
to remedy evolutionary criticisms of the common law doctrine.
For example, in a case involving perceived non-sexual infidelity, the
defendant followed her husband to find him seated in a parked vehicle with
another woman.70 She brought a .22 caliber pistol with her to confront her
husband.71 The evidence established that the husband was fatally shot.72 The
defendant was convicted of manslaughter after both trial and retrial under a
theory of extreme emotional disturbance.73 Note that this case fits none of the
nineteenth century four, particularly in flagrante delicto, because the lover was
not found engaging in a sexual act with a paramour. In a common law
jurisdiction, the judge would not have been able to give instructions to the jury
for heat of passion manslaughter in this case of perceived non-sexual
infidelity.74 But in Arkansas, which adopted the MPC in 1976,75 the jury
67

Id. § 210.3(1).
Id. § 210.3 cmt. 5, at 54 (“In assessing the reasonableness of the explanation or excuse, the section
focuses upon the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes them to
be.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
69 Nourse, supra note 11, at 1331–33.
70 Worring v. State, 638 S.W.2d 678 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding a conviction for manslaughter).
71 Id. at 679.
72 Id.
73 Id. However, the evidence did not establish whether the defendant fired the gun or if the gun
discharged when the husband tried to grab it. The court determined that if the alternative fact pattern occurred,
the defendant would still be liable for manslaughter because the homicide was a result of the defendant’s
recklessness. Id.
74 See Rozelle, supra note 7, at 198–99 (referring to the nineteenth century four and the trending and
more relaxed contemporary approach).
75 Paul H. Robinson & Markus Dirk Dubber, An Introduction to the Model Penal Code 5 (Mar. 12,
1999), https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf.
68
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determined that the defendant committed manslaughter by acting reasonably
under an extreme emotional disturbance in those circumstances.76
While the ALI sought to apply manslaughter more effectively, the MPC
formulation has been accused of severely disadvantaging women by expanding
the scope of the doctrine for situations that do not reflect a colloquial
understanding of crimes of passion as involving “sexual betrayal, love
triangles, [and] sordid affairs.”77 Victoria Nourse documented this expansion
of manslaughter mitigation in MPC jurisdictions by studying fifteen years of
homicide cases in which the judge allowed a manslaughter instruction to go to
the jury.78 She noted that 26% of cases that allowed manslaughter instructions
to go to the jury involved only separation and departure of lovers without any
reported infidelity at all.79
Nourse argued that the liberal reform of manslaughter doctrine is a perverse
and backwards expansion of manslaughter that “reflects, and thus perpetuates,
ideas about men, women, and their relationships that society long ago
abandoned.”80 Nourse criticized the MPC for creating conflicts within the law,
which she attributed to the severe lack of normativity in the mitigation’s
application. And because there is no clear structure to the law, it has evolved in
incongruent ways.81 The reform of passion as extreme emotional disturbance
has permitted mitigation for provocation that was neither extreme nor illegal.82
For example, one case permitted a manslaughter conviction when the
defendant killed his ex-girlfriend for dancing with another person.83 Nourse
noted that it is very rare for the law to embrace criminal activity that is a
response to lawful activity.84

76 Note that from an evolutionary perspective, this case would likely have been mitigated from murder to
manslaughter. The defendant discovered emotional infidelity by her husband, which invokes the problem of
her husband potentially funneling resources away from her and to another woman. See infra Parts II.C, III.B.
77 Nourse, supra note 11, at 1332–51; see also Miller, (Wo)manslaughter, supra note 13.
78 Nourse, supra note 11, at 1345. Nourse’s study involved ninety-nine cases in MPC jurisdictions,
thirty-eight cases in common law jurisdictions, and thirty-five cases in jurisdictions that liberalized traditional
rules by following the common law approach but without the rigidity of the nineteenth century four. Her study
did not include prosecutors’ decisions in whether to prosecute individuals for the crime because that
information would have been too difficult to get. Id. at 1345–47.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1332.
81 Id. at 1369–70.
82 See id. at 1334–35.
83 State v. Martinez, 591 A.2d 155, 156 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
84 Nourse, supra note 11, at 1334–35.
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This expansion of permissible mitigation would also not fit into an
evolutionary model of manslaughter. For example, the departure of a lover is
not an evolutionary problem that can be solved by homicide,85 and so this is
likely not within the set of provocative acts that heat of passion manslaughter
meant to address.86 The law should be more tailored and systematic, and
evolutionary analysis can provide that needed structure by examining the
design of the mind itself.87 The MPC took the law in the right direction to
appropriately and fairly mitigate, but its lack of structure took the law too far.
C. Alternative Approaches: Unwritten Laws and Scholarly Ideas
The MPC was not the first attempt to administer justice when the heat of
passion manslaughter categories seemed inadequate. When presented with
other sympathetic circumstances that reflect the frailty of human nature, juries
and judges have turned to alternative or “unwritten” laws to mete out justice.88
Throughout the nineteenth century, courts used the temporary insanity
defense to address homicides for particularly sympathetic situations that fell
outside the in flagrante delicto paradigm.89 Russell Covey contended that the
temporary insanity defense has been used for situations in which the court
determined that the defendant was somehow “justified” in committing
homicide.90 He explained the similarity between provocation manslaughter and
the temporary insanity defense as granting relief for difficult circumstances,
but he also noted that temporary insanity not only grants relief to the
defendant. It completely exonerates her.91 While a spouse would have to walk
in on the unfaithful sexual act to receive manslaughter mitigation under the
common law, temporary insanity could be used to completely exonerate latearriving defendants who would be barred by the cooling-off requirement or
defendants who discovered infidelity by hearing about it.92 The temporary
insanity defense also opened the way to exonerate “honor killings”—those

85 Cf. Joshua D. Duntley, Adaptations to Dangers from Humans, in THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY 224, 232 (David M. Buss ed., 2005) (enumerating the range of recurrent evolutionary challenges
that were solvable by homicide).
86 Cf. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 219 (1862) (suggesting that the law is meant to mitigate for the
frailties of human nature).
87 See infra Part III.B.
88 Cf. Covey, supra note 26, at 1642–51.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
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committed by fathers and brothers to vindicate the innocence of their daughters
or sisters whom were taken by villainous men.93
Temporary insanity does not seem to be an adequate and effective defense
to address these different scenarios. With its permeable borders, the defense
seems too fluid and based strongly on societal notions of honor and etiquette.
When Daniel Sickles was tried for killing Philip Barton Key the day after he
discovered that Key had an affair with his wife, the court permitted the
temporary insanity defense because he was stricken with an “irresistible
impulse” an entire day later.94 This approach of permitting alternative
adjudications outside of manslaughter to mitigate for colloquially impassioned
killers falls victim to Nourse’s critique of the MPC: it lacks consistent
structure.95 What sufficiently provokes an ordinary person should not be
subjected to the fluid notions of what is socially acceptable at the time of the
offense. It is even more dangerous to allow this kind of adjudication without
any codified standards whatsoever.96 Note that temporary insanity and jury
nullification present the jury with the extreme options of murder conviction or
exoneration without any middle ground that manslaughter mitigation provides.
These avenues permit too much room that could allow social prejudices to
manifest through convictions of disfavored minorities and the exoneration of
favored groups based on social beliefs at the time of trial.
Nourse’s solution for manslaughter’s disparate impact and need for
structure is to entirely restructure the doctrine to permit mitigation for only a
“[w]arranted [e]xcuse.”97 This would entail allowing manslaughter mitigation
for defendants who react to a provocative action that is itself illegal because
the law already deems the act unacceptable;98 the communal concern is clearly
demonstrated by the law’s prohibition, as law is a manifestation of society’s
values.99 The killer who deserves mitigation is the one who “communicate[s]
93

Id. at 1643.
Id. at 1641–44 (quoting NAT BRANDT, THE CONGRESSMAN WHO GOT AWAY WITH MURDER 172
(1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95 Cf. Nourse, supra note 11, at 1369–70 (critiquing the extreme emotional disturbance mitigation for its
lack of normativity).
96 But see Ramsey, supra note 61, at 176–78 (suggesting that male-oriented manslaughter doctrine was
actually implemented to constrain male violence against women and that allowing juries discretion in
convicting similarly situated women actually resulted in benefits for those female defendants). Ramsey’s
article does not advocate for a fair standard; it simply reconceptualizes the feminist critique of the law. Id.
97 Nourse, supra note 11, at 1392.
98 Id. at 1393 (“In such cases, we ‘understand’ the defendant’s emotions because these are the very
emotions to which the law itself appeals for the legitimacy of its own use of violence.”).
99 Id. at 1392.
94
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an emotional judgment . . . that is uncontroversially shared, indeed, that the
law itself recognizes.”100 The law would permit mitigation because community
reacts “with” the defendant for the provocation and response, and that
commiseration is actually codified in the law because the victim committed an
illegal act against the defendant.101
Interestingly enough, Nourse also concluded that passionate killing that
results from infidelity should no longer be afforded mitigation because society
no longer punishes adultery.102 This exposes a fundamental problem in
Nourse’s solution: it moves the doctrine too far from its original purpose of
objectively recognizing the frailty of human nature and, instead, allows
mitigation to be determined by a common consensus of society.103 The fluid
opinion of what society believes to be acceptable and unacceptable does not
have influence on the inherently genetic design of cognition;104 jealousy over
sexual infidelity will still elicit extremely volatile reactions from men for
evolutionarily understandable reasons regardless of whether the law punishes
adultery.105 To take the frailty of human nature seriously, the law must look at
the principles of human nature rather than current societal beliefs.
Another solution is to delete the doctrine entirely.106 This idea is also based
on the criticism that the law disproportionately harms women.107 Emily Miller
noted that men are the primary beneficiaries of both common law
manslaughter and the ALI’s redesign of manslaughter.108 Both perpetuate a

100

Id.
See id. at 1392–93.
102 Id. at 1396 (“Society is no longer willing to punish adultery. In the absence of such a willingness, the
adulterer killer has no claim that his emotions were no different from the emotions to which the law itself
appeals to rationalize punishment.” (footnote omitted)).
103 See, e.g., Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862).
104 STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 60–72 (2002)
(explaining that culture is grounded in psychological mechanisms present in all humans, and thus there is a
necessary connection between the brain’s genetically designed structure and the way it interacts with society);
cf. Peter M. Todd, Ralph Hertwig & Ulrich Hoffrage, Evolutionary Cognitive Psychology, in THE HANDBOOK
OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 85, at 776, 776 (“Humans were not directly selected to process
information, or to store it, learn it, attend to it, represent it—or even, in fact, to think. All of these
capacities . . . can be seen as epiphenomena arising over the course of evolution from the need to get the
central jobs done: survival and reproduction.”).
105 See infra Part II.B; see also DAVID M. BUSS, THE DANGEROUS PASSION: WHY JEALOUSY IS AS
NECESSARY AS LOVE AND SEX 6 (2000).
106 Miller, (Wo)manslaughter, supra note 13, at 692.
107 Id. (“By abolishing the heat of passion defense, the law would take a meaningful step forward in
protecting the rights of women.”).
108 Id.
101
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sociological problem that “[f]irst, culture socializes a man to express anger
through violence, then the man kills a woman who departs, and the jury then
reinforces cultural mores by mitigating punishment from murder to
manslaughter.”109
Her solution is to abolish manslaughter doctrine entirely to better ensure
the safety of women.110 However, many of Miller’s arguments are based on
assumptions stemming from a sociological point of view;111 this Comment
argues that the law should instead be evaluated from an evolutionary
perspective.112 It is important to determine whether the law has an accurate
concept of the mind rather than to completely write off the doctrine; the law’s
own misconception may have produced disparities at a sociological level of
analysis. By examining manslaughter through evolutionary analysis, the law
can mitigate for the frailty of human nature that transcends the sexes.
The next section juxtaposes the evolutionary perspective on passion killing
with manslaughter doctrine. At common law, these homicides present juries
with the option of either a murder conviction or acquittal through jury
nullification or temporary insanity.113 The former feels too harsh but the latter
seems too lenient. There is likely a sense of sympathy and understanding
because every human (indeed, the ordinary person) is equipped with the same
psychological structures. The juxtaposition of evolutionary analysis with legal
analysis demonstrates a bias toward flexibility for men and rigidity for
women.114

109

Id. at 686.
Id. at 692.
111 See id. at 680–83.
112 Indeed, it is the frailty of the mind that is mitigated—not the frailty of society. See Andersen v. United
States, 170 U.S. 481, 510 (1898); see also PINKER, supra note 104, at 60–72.
113 See Covey, supra note 26, at 1642–51 (outlining the use of temporary insanity as a way to avoid
murder convictions for homicides committed in extreme passions).
114 To begin, it is important to note that men do, indeed, commit homicide more often than women. See
Expanded Homicide Data Table 6, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crimein-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10shrtbl06.xls (last visited Sept. 24, 2012). Evolutionary theorists
have predicted this higher rate of male aggression. However, it still remains the fact that women do become
impassioned as men do and may kill as a result of it. See Wilson & Daly, supra note 3. The important point is
that women tend to kill for different reasons, and there is no reason that these female killers, overcome by
similarly evolved passions, should not have their crimes mitigated simply because they kill less frequently. For
an evolutionary explanation of why men tend to be more aggressive than women, see David M. Buss & Todd
K. Shackelford, Human Aggression in Evolutionary Psychological Perspective, 17 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV.
605, 612–13 (1997), which explains that the higher rate of male aggression is due to women controlling men’s
access to reproductive success and ensuing conflicts over men’s strategies to achieve access through
competition with each other that involves intrasexual violence.
110
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II. PASSION KILLING—AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE
Although it has been accepted that there are more differences among men
and women than between them,115 studies in evolutionary psychology have
suggested some important differences that impact the way men and women
experience attraction, relationships, and jealousy.116 This Part outlines those
differences and their relevance to the evolutionary solution to manslaughter
mitigation. Section A provides a general overview of the evolutionary
landscape, including a discussion on intra-human homicide and the
background causes of sex differences. Section B ventures into male mating
strategies and threats against a male’s reproductive fitness to give background
on the source of the masculine heat of passion. Section C does the same for
female mating strategies, jealousy patterns, and related emotional responses,
and it illustrates the conflict when the sexes engage in mating behaviors.

115 MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, THE GENDERED SOCIETY 2 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining the wide range of
femaleness and maleness that transcends the sexes).
116 E.g., David M. Buss, Sex Differences in Human Mate Preferences: Evolutionary Hypotheses Tested in
37 Cultures, 12 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 1–49 (1989); David M. Buss et al., Research Report, Sex Differences
in Jealousy: Evolution, Physiology, and Psychology, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI. 251, 251 (1992); Martin Daly et al.,
Male Sexual Jealousy, 3 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 11, 18 (1982) (“But although both sexes experience
jealousy, just what they experience evidently differs.”); John E. Edlund et al., Sex Differences in Jealousy in
Response to Actual Infidelity, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 468 (2006), http://www.epjournal.net/wp-content/
uploads/ep04462470.pdf (“In conclusion, our results demonstrate than [sic] sex differences in jealousy are not
limited to responses to hypothetical infidelity scenarios. Sex differences also emerge in response to actual
infidelity experiences.”); Maryanne Fisher et al., Sex Differences in Feelings of Guilt Arising from Infidelity,
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 441–44 (2008), http://www.epjournal.net/wp-content/uploads/EP06436446.pdf
(reporting data supporting sex differences in feelings of guilt arising from different types of infidelity); Chris
Reiber & Justin R. Garcia, Hooking Up: Gender Differences, Evolution, and Pluralistic Ignorance,
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 398–401 (2010), http://www.epjournal.net/wp-content/uploads/EP08390404.pdf
(reporting data supporting the notion of sex differences in hook-up behavior).
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A. General Evolutionary Principles117
Homicide is an important topic to evolutionary theorists.118 When a person
is killed, the consequences are obvious regarding survival and reproduction.119
The question arises why humans would evolve in a way that would be terribly
detrimental to other members of the same species. A few theories have been
advanced regarding how homicide came into the human behavioral repertoire.
Some suggest that homicidal acts are only the by-products of other
evolutionary adaptations.120 Others have concluded that homicidal acts are
adaptations per se in that they have been used to solve evolutionary problems
over history.121 Whether killing another human is a by-product or an actual
adaptation is not the most important question for addressing manslaughter;
rather, it is the question of when these homicides are predictable responses.
A wide range of evolutionary challenges is solvable by homicide,122
although it is important to remember that homicide is not a desirable solution

117 Before exploring evolutionary principles, it is important to note that there is disagreement among
evolutionary psychologists as to the mating repertoire of humans (as monogamous, polygamous, polygynous,
or a combination, as well as long-term versus short-term). See David P. Schmitt, Fundamentals of Human
Mating Strategies, in THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 85, at 258, 258 (“Some
[evolutionary psychologists] contend that humans are exclusively designed for lifelong monogamy. Others
argue that humans are designed to mate with more than one person at a time, usually in the form of polygynous
or extramarital relationships. Still others posit that humans possess a mixed or pluralistic mating repertoire and
that men and women each evolved facultative strategies of their own.” (citations omitted)); Donald Symons,
Adaptationism and Human Mating Psychology, in THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra
note 85, at 255, 255–57. The manslaughter interest does not lie in what human mating strategies are, but rather
what mechanisms have been installed that would incite the individual into a jealous heat of passion to kill. For
more information on human mating patterns, see Schmitt, supra at 270.
118 See MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE 1–2 (1988); Duntley, supra note 85, at 231–36;
Douglas T. Kenrick et al., Power, Harassment, and Trophy Mates: The Feminist Advantages of an
Evolutionary Perspective, in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT: EVOLUTIONARY AND FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 29, 35
(David M. Buss & Neil M. Malamuth eds., 1996); Margo Wilson et al., Femicide: An Evolutionary
Psychological Perspective, in FEMINISM AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY: BOUNDARIES, INTERSECTIONS, AND
FRONTIERS 431 (Patricia Adair Gowaty ed., 1997).
119 Duntley, supra note 85, at 233–34 (explaining the costs to a human if he or she is killed: loss of future
reproduction, damage to existing children, damage to extended kin group, and potential benefits to rivals of
deceased’s kin group).
120 DALY & WILSON, supra note 118.
121 Joshua D. Duntley & David M. Buss, Homicide Adaptations, 16 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 399
(2011). But see Russil Durrant, Born to Kill? A Critical Evaluation of Homicide Adaptation Theory, 14
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 374 (2009) (critiquing homicide adaptation theory).
122 See Duntley, supra note 85, at 232 (enumerating the range of recurrent evolutionary challenges that
were solvable by homicide).
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in most circumstances.123 An important problem is protection of the self and
other persons of importance, such as children, spouses, and relatives.124 A
woman can avoid rape by killing her rapist. A man can avoid being cuckolded
by killing his wife’s paramour.125 A father can protect his spouse, children, and
home by killing attackers.126 Groups of humans can protect their resources by
killing (i.e., engaging in warfare) another group of humans.127 Even less
favorably for a modern society, a man can kill his stepchild to avoid funneling
resources to an individual not carrying his genetic material.128 Again, note that
homicide is not the preferred method in dealing with all of these problems all
of the time because a homicidal act comes with high risks and high costs.129
But nonetheless, when the combination is right, humans may engage a mental
formula to commit homicide, whether it be the product of other adaptations or
an adaptation in itself.
Before discussing passion killing propensities and manslaughter, the
critical question arises: If the law mitigates some murders to manslaughter and
homicidal propensities are built into the psyche for certain circumstances, why
not mitigate for all circumstances that fall within the purview of an
evolutionary challenge? The obvious answer is that to do so would be to
commit the naturalistic fallacy—the false notion that just because humans have
a tendency to act a certain way the law should allow it in some way. Although
humans possess the propensity to kill in a wide range of circumstances that
would solve the individual’s problems, the law seeks to modify behavior to be
more socially desirable.130
However, in the realm of manslaughter, the law has reached into the natural
world for guidance.131 When the common law mitigates murder to

123 It is very important to remember that just because a challenge was, and is, solvable by homicide, it is
not the inevitable response because other mechanisms engage to protect the individual from the harms of large
risks. See id. (“In most sets of circumstances, the extremely high costs of committing murder would have
outweighed its benefits.”).
124 See id.
125 This will be discussed at length below. See infra Part II.B.
126 See Duntley, supra note 85, at 232.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 See id.
130 See Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Psychology and the Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 85, at 953, 953.
131 See Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 219 (1862) (“[T]he law, out of indulgence to the frailty of human
nature, or rather, in recognition of the laws upon which human nature is constituted . . . regards the offense as
of a less heinous character . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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manslaughter for the “frailty of human nature” in cases of sexual infidelity, it
incorporates real, natural frailties into the legal framework.132 This Comment
makes that incorporation clear, predictable, and nondiscriminatory by
suggesting a fair standard that is applicable across the sexes. Here, we turn to
that very question of what the relevant sex difference really is in the frailty of
human nature.
As evolutionary psychologist David Buss stated, “Observing that men and
women differ . . . is not the same as explaining why they differ.”133 This
underlying explanation can lead to a better understanding of the legally
unrecognized states of mind that would lead to passion killing outside of the
sexual infidelity paradigm. Due to the different biological designs and required
investments in reproduction, the sexes have faced different evolutionary
pressures over thousands of years that shaped their experiences of mating and
jealousy.134
The most biologically obvious difference between the sexes is the required
investment for each to reproduce.135 To successfully pass on her genes to
offspring, a woman invests nine long, energy-depriving months to carry a
child, and after birth, she will engage in years of child-rearing which also
requires an incredible amount of time and energy that could be used for her
own benefit and survival.136 Men must only invest minutes, or even just
seconds, to complete their role in the reproductive process.137 Women do not
132 See, e.g., Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481, 510 (1898) (“The law, in recognition of the frailty
of human nature, regards a homicide committed under the influence of sudden passion, or in hot blood
produced by adequate cause, and before a reasonable time has elapsed for the blood to cool, as an offen[s]e of
a less heinous character than murder.”); Maher, 10 Mich. 212.
133 BUSS, supra note 105, at 16.
134 See, e.g., id. (“An ancestral woman, in contrast, could have had sex with hundreds of partners in the
course of a single year and still have produced only a single child. Unless a woman’s regular partner proved to
be infertile, additional sex partners did not translate into additional children. As a consequence, men evolved a
more powerful craving for sex with a variety of women.”); Daly et al., supra note 116, at 18 (“But although
both sexes experience jealousy, just what they experience evidently differs.”).
135 See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 117, at 269 (“[M]en incur much lower levels of obligatory or ‘minimum’
parental investment in offspring than women do. Women are obligated to incur the costs of internal
fertilization, placentation, and gestation in order to reproduce.” (citations omitted)).
136 See BUSS, supra note 105, at 16; Schmitt, supra note 117, at 269. Also note the strong incentive that
the mother care for her child; other mothers who did not were less likely to pass their apathetic emotional
drives on to the next generation, so it is much more likely that a mother feels compelled to raise her child. For
a summary on the evolution of parenting, see David C. Geary, Evolution of Parental Investment, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 85, at 483.
137 BUSS, supra note 105, at 16 (“To produce a single child, women bear the burdens and pleasures of nine
months of pregnancy—an obligatory form of parental investment that men cannot share. Men, to produce the
same child, need only devote a few hours, a few minutes, or even a few seconds.”).
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have the option of quickly reproducing; their reproductive success is usually
limited to one child per nine months and the survival of that child.138 Thus, the
gene pool has been saturated with women who vigilantly guard their
reproductive capabilities by allowing access to only those men with whom they
deliberately choose to engage in sexual activity, often because the man has
indicated an interest in staying around.139
Jealousy is a human adaptation with manifest sex differences. It increases
fitness by contributing to reproductive success, and it adds texture to the
passions in human nature.140 Our ancestors who engaged in jealous behavior
out-reproduced those who did not because that kind of behavior encourages
fidelity on the part of the mate.141 That is to say, jealous behaviors
“incentivize” the mate to be faithful, and those who did not care about fidelity
had their genes removed from the population.142 Because jealous ancestors outreproduced and dominated the gene pool, non-jealous humans had their
psychological traits removed from the evolutionary pedigree.143 However,
“[d]espite its value for people past and present, jealousy is an emotion that
exposes partners to extreme danger” because it can produce a very volatile
state of mind.144

138 Id. (“An ancestral woman, in contrast, could have had sex with hundreds of partners in the course of a
single year and still have produced only a single child. Unless a woman’s regular partner proved to be infertile,
additional sex partners did not translate into additional children.”). But cf. Symons, supra note 117, at 271 (“A
key caveat, though, is that women’s psychology of short-term mating appears to center more on obtaining men
of high-genetic quality rather than numerous men in high-volume quantity.” (citations omitted)). Studies have
shown that, for most mammals, the female is the parent more invested in offspring. See T.H. CLUTTON-BROCK,
THE EVOLUTION OF PARENTAL CARE 151–52 (1991) (explaining the costs and benefits of bi-parental and uniparental models for endotherms).
139 Schmitt, supra note 117, at 268 (explaining parental investment theory and how the sex with heavier
investment in offspring will approach mating in certain distinct patterns from the other sex).
140 BUSS, supra note 105, at 5; Buss et al., supra note 116, at 251 (“Jealousy is defined as an emotional
state that is aroused by a perceived threat to a valued relationship or position and motivates behavior aimed at
countering the threat.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Daly et al., supra note 116, at 18 (“But
although both sexes experience jealousy, just what they experience evidently differs.”).
141 See BUSS, supra note 105, at 5 (“Nonjealous men and women, however, are not our ancestors, having
been left in the evolutionary dust by rivals with different passionate sensibilities.”).
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 Id. at 6.
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B. Male Mating Interests and Jealousy
As the less-investing sex, men developed different mating and relationship
interests than those that women developed,145 and these differences play out
significantly in manslaughter doctrine. David Buss and David Schmitt
identified five problems that our ancestral fathers faced when engaging in
long-term mating: paternity confidence, female reproductive value,
commitment, good parenting skills, and gene quality.146
Sexual infidelity may inflame homicidal passion because of paternal
confidence147: the evolutionary problem that the ancestral father could never
know whether the child born by his mate was actually his biological child.148
In other words, a man can never determine whether the child born by his mate
is genetically his because impregnation occurs inside the body of the female.149
The risk of cuckoldry was significant because it could result in a man investing
years of time and resources into offspring who were not carrying his genetic
material, which was detrimental to his overall evolutionary success.150 Thus,
men evolved psychological mechanisms to address the problem of paternal
confidence.151 Buss and Schmitt predicted that “[m]en’s jealousy will be
activated strongly by cues to sexual infidelity because that is the act that would
have been reproductively damaging to ancestral men.”152 Because a man
cannot tell whether his wife cheated on him and was impregnated by another

145 Schmitt, supra note 117, at 268–69 (explaining the different patterns in the less-investing and moreinvesting sex for animal species in general, as well as male humans as the less-investing sex for homo
sapiens).
146 David M. Buss & David P. Schmitt, Sexual Strategies Theory: An Evolutionary Perspective on Human
Mating, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 204, 207 tbl.1 (1993). For an explanation of how men have addressed each of
these challenges over evolutionary history, see id. at 216–18. This is, of course, before modern paternity
testing procedures. Because the human psyche was selected and designed over thousands of years before any
modern technology, humans today still possess psychological mechanisms to cope with evolutionary problems
despite the novelty of today’s technologies.
147 See BUSS, supra note 105, at 17; DAVID M. BUSS, THE MURDERER NEXT DOOR: WHY THE MIND IS
DESIGNED TO KILL 55–56 (2005) [hereinafter BUSS, THE MURDERER NEXT DOOR].
148 BUSS, THE MURDERER NEXT DOOR, supra note 147, at 55–56; Buss et al., supra note 116, at 251
(explaining the issue presented by internal impregnation); Buss & Schmitt, supra note 146, at 216–18.
149 Buss & Schmitt, supra note 146, at 215 (“Indeed, women are at least somewhat unique among
primates in that ovulation is cryptic, or concealed . . . .”).
150 BUSS, supra note 105, at 4 (“From an ancestral man’s perspective, the single most damaging form of
infidelity his partner could commit, in the currency of reproduction, would have been a sexual infidelity. A
woman’s sexual infidelity jeopardizes a man’s confidence that he is the genetic father of her children. A
cuckolded man risks investing years, or even decades, in another man’s children.”).
151 Buss & Schmitt, supra note 146, at 216–18.
152 Id. at 216 (citations omitted); see also Daly et al., supra note 116, at 18.
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man, he adapted strong interests to monitor his mate and ensure sexual
fidelity.153
It is because of paternity uncertainty that we see such strong passions from
men regarding the sexual infidelity of their partners.154 The most damaging
thing that can happen to a man’s reproductive fitness is to be cuckolded and
unwittingly expend time and resources on the offspring of another man.155 It is
no surprise that psychological, physiological, and cross-cultural studies have
repeatedly demonstrated that men exhibit jealousy for sexual infidelity
systematically and significantly more than women.156 The following anecdote
about a reunited married couple illustrates a predictable emotional response to
sexual infidelity that is also quintessential manslaughter:
Then she said that since she came back in April she had fucked this
other man about ten times. I told her how can you talk about love and
marriage and you been fucking this other man. I was really mad. I
went to the kitchen and got the knife. I went back to our room and
asked: Were you serious when you told me that? She said yes. We
fought on the bed, I was stabbing her. Her grandfather came up and
tried to take the knife out of my hand. . . . I don’t know why I killed
157
the woman, I loved her.

Regarding heat of passion manslaughter, the parallel seems evident
between finding one’s partner in flagrante delicto and sexual infidelity
invoking strong passions due to paternal uncertainty. Because men have
traditionally been in power in Western culture throughout the development of
the common law,158 (male) lawmakers would have been cognizant of the
enormous distress caused by sexual unfaithfulness in the confines of
153 BUSS, THE MURDERER NEXT DOOR, supra note 147, at 55–56 (“Men who were indifferent to the
sexual contact that their wives might have with other men ended up raising their rival’s children more often
than men who didn’t tolerate their mates’ indiscretions.”).
154 See Daly et al., supra note 116, at 11. Indeed, the King’s Bench might have been correct in asserting
that, with sexual infidelity, “there could not be greater provocation.” See Manning’s Case, (1617) 83 Eng. Rep.
112 (K.B.).
155 BUSS, supra note 105, at 4.
156 Buss et al., supra note 116, at 251; Edlund et al., supra note 116, at 467. However, there has been
critique of these studies on methodological grounds, suggesting that men and women might experience the
same amount of distress over both sexual and emotional infidelity. See David DeSteno et al., Sex Differences
in Jealousy: Evolutionary Mechanism or Artifact of Measurement?, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1103, 1103 (2002) (arguing that the perceived sex difference from studies indicating a sex difference is derived
from a methodological issue in research from a forced-choice response measure).
157 BUSS, supra note 105, at 7 (emphasis added).
158 See Miller, Inherent (Gender) Unreasonableness, supra note 13, at 253–56 (explaining the maleoriented development of the common law).
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relationships.159 That distress and shared sense of understanding find their
roots in evolution.160 As a universal challenge faced by all men over the course
of thousands of years, evolutionary principles predict that this extreme jealousy
response is present in most men. Thus, in a male-dominated legal system,
mitigation for the frailty of human nature or the laws upon which human nature
is constituted would incorporate male frailties but not necessarily female ones.
C. Female Mating Interests and Jealousy
“No woman ever gave birth and, watching the child emerge from her
womb, wondered whether the child was really hers.”161 Thus, it is not
surprising that women did not evolve similar extreme jealousy responses like
men regarding sexual infidelity: a child a woman bears is obviously hers and
carries her genetic material.162 However, given the required investment in
reproduction, our ancestral mothers faced their own set of evolutionary
problems.163 Of interest to manslaughter doctrine is the problem of identifying
men who are willing to invest. Our ancestral mothers faced the risk of losing
time, resources, and commitment from a mate toward her and her offspring if
he abandoned her or diverted resources to other partners.164 For that reason,
women will experience greater jealousy responses to emotional infidelity than
will men.165
Indeed, women have reported significantly greater distress in response to
emotional infidelity than to sexual infidelity in numerous studies.166 The

159 See, e.g., R v. Mawgridge, (1707) 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1115 (Q.B.) (“[J]ealousy is the rage of a man,
and adultery is the highest invasion of property. . . . [A] man cannot receive a higher provocation.”). This issue
of men’s mate-guarding passions also seems related to the old common law that viewed women and their
sexual access as property of the man. Cf. Miller, (Wo)manslaughter, supra note 13, at 686.
160 Cf. HENDRIK GOMMER, A BIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 131 (2011) (“Our standards of what is wrong
and what is right have to be consistent with basic biological mechanisms.”).
161 BUSS, supra note 105, at 4.
162 Id.
163 Buss & Schmitt, supra note 146, at 207 tbl.1 (summarizing mating challenges as identifying men who
are able to invest, willing to invest, offer physical protection, willing to commit, have good parenting skills,
and have good gene quality).
164 Buss et al., supra note 116.
165 Id. at 251. This disturbance over emotional infidelity plays out significantly in the Moriarty homicide,
described above. See supra notes 48–55 and accompanying text.
166 Buss et al., supra note 116, at 254–55; Edlund et al., supra note 116, at 462; Achim Schützwohl,
Which Infidelity Type Makes You More Jealous? Decision Strategies in a Forced-Choice Between Sexual and
Emotional Infidelity, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 121 (2004), http://www.epjournal.net/wp-content/uploads/
ep02121128.pdf. However, note that a methodological dispute has been advanced that affects this data. See
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greater distress is predictable because emotional attachment serves as an
indication of resource allocation.167 A mate’s development of an emotional
attachment to another person serves as a signal that the mate will provide fewer
resources to the primary individual.168 Those women who developed jealous
traits to pick up these cues and engage in activities that elicit greater mate
investment would have successfully reproduced more than those who did not,
and thus their genes and psychological traits would have spread throughout the
population.169 Consider the following anecdote about a woman’s emotional
response to her boyfriend’s affair:
My boyfriend was cheating on me with this girl. She was a real bitch
to everyone. My boyfriend was going to dump me for her. I hated her
for taking my boyfriend, plus she treated him like crap. I thought
170
about strangling her or chopping her head off.

She fantasized of homicide because she was distressed about the fact that her
boyfriend might leave her for someone else—not that he was engaging in
sexual relations when cheating.171
Feminine passion over emotional infidelity may be ignited by indicators
that resources are being diverted; this is parallel to a man’s distress over sexual
infidelity.172 Both are threats against the individual’s reproductive fitness.
Ancestral mothers may have developed psychological mechanisms to key in on
emotional infidelity in their mates as a way to protect against the disastrous
loss of investment from those mates with whom they have decided to
reproduce.173 The loss of investment harms the woman’s fitness by reducing

DeSteno et al., supra note 155, at 1103 (arguing that the perceived sex difference from studies indicating a sex
difference is derived from a methodological fault in the research).
167 Lorne Campbell & Bruce J. Ellis, Commitment, Love, and Mate Retention, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 85, at 419, 434 (explaining that emotional infidelity is tied to
resource allocation—resulting in an evolutionary challenge for the woman—because “[i]f a man falls in love
with another women [sic] and subsequently leaves the relationship to form another, his resources will be
largely directed away from the abandoned woman”).
168 Buss et al., supra note 116, at 251 (“[W]e hypothesize that cues to the development of a deep
emotional attachment have been reliable leading indicators to women of potential reduction or loss of their
mate’s investment.”).
169 Campbell & Ellis, supra note 167, at 434.
170 BUSS, THE MURDERER NEXT DOOR, supra note 147, at 31.
171 See id.; Schützwohl, supra note 166, at 126.
172 BUSS, supra note 105, at 4–5; Schützwohl, supra note 166, at 121–22.
173 See BUSS, supra note 105, at 4 (“Because emotional involvement is the most reliable signal of this
disastrous loss, women key in on cues to a partner’s feelings for other women. A husband’s one-night sexual
stand is agonizing, of course, but most women want to know: ‘Do you love her?’”).
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available resources for the survival of her and her young.174 It also decreases
her chances of reproductive success by finding another mate because a man
would be less willing to invest in a woman and her children if the children
were not his.175
At this point, one can see the inadequacy of manslaughter as applied to
Moriarty’s homicidal rage.176 She decided to “mate” with Shehan and he
impregnated her.177 It was important to her that they be married to ensure his
continued commitment to supporting her and their new child; but instead, he
clearly indicated that he was leaving her.178 From an evolutionary perspective,
she discovered that she had been fooled and was now carrying a child whose
father would not help support her, so she was pushed into a wild panic that
resulted in homicide. This emotional response is just as predictable as a man’s
response to sexual infidelity.179 In both situations, the individual’s overall
fitness (as illustrated by his or her biological makeup and different survival and
reproductive interests) was severely threatened by the actions of his or her
romantic partner. Killing might not be the most advantageous response in most
situations,180 but these kinds of threats move the ordinary person closer to a
state of mind in which homicide is a possible solution.181

174

Campbell & Ellis, supra note 167, at 434 (explaining that loss of paternal investment would be
detrimental to the woman’s ability to raise her offspring to reproductive age).
175 See id.
176 See JONES, supra note 12, at 184.
177 See id.
178 Id.
179 See BUSS, supra note 105, at 52 (“A woman’s desire for emotional involvement . . . will be violated
when a potential partner treats her as a one-night stand. A man’s desire for a partner’s sexual fidelity will be
violated when his partner has sex with another man.”).
180 This might explain Susan Rozelle’s assertion that most people who discover adultery do not kill their
spouse. See Rozelle, supra note 7, at 220–26. However, this Comment disagrees with the conclusion that,
therefore, all people should be assumed to be able to control passions because that is not in accordance with
the evolutionary perspective.
181 It is important to remember that manslaughter doctrine does not assume that the ordinary person kills;
rather, it is a concession that an ordinary person could be pushed into a state of mind in which he or she might
kill. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 505 A.2d 545, 548 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (“For a provocation to be
‘adequate,’ it must be ‘calculated to inflame the passion of a reasonable man and tend to cause him to act for
the moment from passion rather than reason.’” (quoting ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 56 (2d ed.
1969))); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a), at 54 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980)
(explaining that the mitigation is a “concession to human weakness” and that “one who kills in response to
certain provoking events should be regarded as demonstrating a significantly different character deficiency
than one who kills in their absence”).
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III. THE EVOLUTIONARY SOLUTION
This Part offers an evolutionary solution that replaces sexual infidelity as
the basis for manslaughter mitigation with a standard of mitigation based on
threats to reproductive fitness. The first section outlines the relevant
philosophical theories explaining the use of manslaughter mitigation and their
relation to the evolutionary solution. After developing an understanding of the
mitigation’s philosophical justifications, the following section weaves
evolutionary theory into manslaughter doctrine and discusses how it will affect
the landscape of mitigation.
A. The Evolutionary Union of Partial Excuse and Partial Justification
Scholars have debated the continued purpose of manslaughter mitigation
under a number of different rationales: partial excuse,182 partial justification,183
a combination thereof,184 and “akrasia.”185 While this Comment does not seek
to join that conversation, it does support a combination of partial excuse and
partial justification in cases of infidelity. A threat to reproductive fitness must
come from a particular person, and the threat engages the emotional response
that provokes the homicidal response. It is worth discussion here because it
will play a large role in the scope of mitigation advocated by this Comment in
the subsequent section.

182 Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 421, 467 (1982); Timothy Macklem & John Gardner, Provocation and Pluralism, 64 MOD. L.
REV. 815 (2001).
183 See Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1, 4, 73–75 (2003)
(“A justified action is not criminal, whereas an excused defendant has committed a crime but is not
punishable.”); see also Finbarr McAuley, Anticipating the Past: The Defence of Provocation in Irish Law, 50
MOD. L. REV. 133, 150 (1987).
184 Berman & Farrell, supra note 31, at 1047–55.
185 Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677, 1683–84 (2005). Stephen Garvey took an
entirely different approach to heat of passion manslaughter that jettisoned the distinction between partial
excuse and partial justification as important. Id. at 1683. Rather, he argued that the law separates those who
kill in defiance of the law and those who kill under the momentary belief that the act would be legal or from
the weakness of will. Id. at 1683–84. He used the Greek term “akrasia” to make the distinction: defiance and
akrasia are two different levels of culpability, the latter of which is less deserving of reprimand than the
former. Id. at 1684. Essentially, the defendant becomes unable to obey the law because of emotional pressures
and weakness of will. See Berman & Farrell, supra note 31, at 1060 (summarizing this culpability advocated
by Garvey as “despite wanting to obey the law, he succumbs to temptation”). However, this approach has been
strongly criticized as a gateway for mitigating all crimes in which a defendant was simply unable to resist
temptation. Id. at 1061–62.
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The most prominent explanation for manslaughter mitigation emphasizes
that the homicide occurred while the defendant’s reasoning capacity was
diminished, and thus the defendant is less deserving of reprimand and partially
excused.186 The rationale concludes that, according to common experience,
individuals in states of extreme rage or under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbances are unable to make “appropriate choices.”187 The
emotion itself is either understandable or justified according to law, and thus
the homicide is partially excusable.188
There are two branches of partial excuse theory: excused emotion and
justified emotion. Under an excused emotion rationale, the defendant is
thought to have been placed in a state of mind that was not voluntary, and thus
the defendant cannot be blamed for his anger that diminished his reasoning
capacity.189 This can be contrasted with voluntary intoxication, when crimes
committed during the state of diminished reasoning capacity are not as
excusable because of the defendant’s involvement in creating that
diminishment.190 From the evolutionary perspective, when the defendant is
responding to a threat against reproductive fitness, the threat was likely not
induced by the actions of the killer. She is reacting to decisions made by other
free agents to commit adultery or to seduce and abandon, which means the
threat comes from an outside source.191
Additionally under the partial excuse theory, some theorists argue for
mitigation under a justified emotion rationale.192 The emotion that led to the
impassioned homicide was itself justified in light of the surrounding

186

See Dressler, supra note 182, at 464; Macklem & Gardner, supra note 182, at 819.
Berman & Farrell, supra note 31, at 1047.
188 Id. at 1047–55 (discussing how the partial excuse rationale has been thought of as either an excusable
emotion or a justified emotion).
189 See Dressler, supra note 182, at 463–64.
190 See id. (“[P]rovocation is an excuse premised upon involuntariness based upon reduced choicecapabilities. If the doctrine is to be defensible, however, it must follow that the anger which undermines
choice-capability is itself formed under circumstances in which the actor cannot be fairly blamed for his anger.
Otherwise, we have a case of voluntary anger, no more morally deserving of mitigation than voluntary
intoxication.”).
191 Indeed, there but for the grace of God, go I.
192 Berman and Farrell make this distinction between “excused emotion” and “justified emotion.” Berman
& Farrell, supra note 31, at 1052 (“Some commentators who claim that provocation is a partial excuse explain
the adequate provocation requirement by arguing that the defendant’s heat of passion is justified rather than
excused. . . . Despite the element of justified emotion, advocates of this approach characterize their accounts as
excuse theories.” (footnote omitted)).
187
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circumstances.193 Because the emotion is justified (i.e., a cognitively
appropriate response), the acts derived from these emotions are less deserving
of blame. And from the evolutionary perspective, this brings in the issue of
predictability. When the emotion is expected given known psychological
propensities, it can be said to be justified because it is a cognitively appropriate
response.194
It is important to note that the crime is not mitigated because the defendant
lost self-control; the terms “loss of self-control” and “diminished reasoning
capacity” are not synonymous. Indeed, some scholars have argued that because
the defendant still maintains an extent of self-control during the altercation, she
does not deserve mitigation for the mental disturbance.195 The main point is
that the defendant was not automatically pushed into committing homicide;
rather, she was placed in a state of mind in which passion clouded her
judgment and killing became an acceptable course of action.196 And indeed,
this is the case from the evolutionary perspective; homicide is rarely the best
solution for a problem, but nonetheless it can be used to solve it.197
The other major school of thought—partial justification—holds that a
defendant who kills in the heat of passion should receive mitigation for the
homicide because she was provoked in a manner that partially warranted a
response against the provoker.198 This school focuses on the circumstances
surrounding how the defendant is provoked rather than the emotional state of
mind the defendant experiences.199 If a justified action is not a criminal action,
then a partially justified action is less criminal than one not justified at all.200 It
has been argued that the defense should only be implemented in circumstances

193 Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 269, 305 (1996) (indicating that this approach also compensates for the problem in ensuring that the
provocation came from the appropriate source—the victim). Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum took a more
cognition-sensitive approach and argued that a homicide is mitigation-worthy when the defendant makes a
“cognitive appraisal[]” that is appropriate given the circumstances. Id. at 273, 306–07.
194 Cf. id.
195 See, e.g., Rozelle, supra note 7, at 199 (arguing that we should expect people to fully control their
actions when faced with an unfaithful spouse).
196 See Carter v. State, 505 A.2d 545, 548 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (“For provocation to be ‘adequate,’
it must be ‘calculated to inflame the passion of a reasonable man and tend to cause him to act for the moment
from passion rather than reason.’” (quoting PERKINS, supra note 181, at 56)).
197 See supra Part II.A.
198 See Rozelle, supra note 7.
199 Id.
200 Berman, supra note 183, at 4 (“A justified action is not criminal, whereas an excused defendant has
committed a crime but is not punishable.”).
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where the defendant was partially justified in responding in a homicidal
manner regardless of the diminished reasoning capacity, which would
effectively reduce the number of times in which mitigation is applied.201 This
theory emphasizes the circumstances of the killing and what pushed the
defendant to act, rather than the defendant’s diminished capacity to reason.202
Of course, this theory has been criticized because it suggests killing a person
may be justified and does not adequately explain the heat of passion or extreme
emotional disturbance requirement of manslaughter.203
Evolutionary theory also finds relevance under this philosophy. A threat
against an individual’s reproductive fitness comes from another individual.204
Thus, in a sense, the victim committed a “natural crime” against the
defendant’s interests. To mitigate under this philosophy seems to partially
validate an individual’s homicide against another person who was not exactly
innocent in her own right.
But, overall, the evolutionary solution operates as a union of both partial
excuse and partial justification. Indeed, even outside of an evolutionary
context, Andrew Ashworth argued that the entanglement of the two rationales
is no accident and that it is a necessary combination for the functionality of the
mitigation.205 His union of the two rationales has been expanded by two other
proponents of the same combination.206

201 Rozelle, supra note 7, at 200 (arguing that, by limiting the use of this doctrine to justified situations,
the defense will be closer to its beginnings and original rationale).
202 See, e.g., Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative Liability in
Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385, 414 (2005) (“The fact that the law asks not only how badly the actor
was distressed but also why he was so badly distressed implies that the rationale for the defense lies in the
source of provocation, not merely the actor’s disturbed state of mind.” (footnote omitted)).
203 Indeed, if the only issue to consider is whether the circumstances surrounding provocation of the
homicide are justifiable, then the issue of the defendant’s state of mind becomes irrelevant. Garvey, supra note
185, at 1691. Thus, the rationale cannot adequately explain each requirement for the defense to be satisfied.
Berman & Farrell, supra note 31, at 1065.
204 Cf. Joshua D. Duntley, supra note 85, at 225 (explaining that humans evolved the propensity to inflict
costs on others “as a strategy to outcompete rivals, leaving the winner in control of the reproductively relevant
resources”).
205 A. J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292, 317 (1976) (“Provocation
mitigates moral culpability to the extent that a person acted in a less-than-fully-controlled manner in
circumstances in which there was reasonable justification for him to feel aggrieved at the conduct of
another.”).
206 Berman & Farrell, supra note 31, at 1058–59 (explaining that this needs to be expanded because
“[d]espite his endorsement of a dual rationale, . . . Ashworth does not give a detailed theoretical framework for
the defense as both partial excuse and partial justification”).

BROUSSARD PROOFS1

2012]

10/31/2012 7:49 AM

PRINCIPLES FOR PASSION KILLING

209

These theorists argue that partial excuse and partial justification are both
necessary—but not sufficient—to explain the mitigation.207 Neither rationale is
able to serve as the foundation of the mitigation on its own because neither can
account for the dual requirements of the doctrine—passion and legal
provocation.208 Rather, the defendant must be partially excused because of her
distressed state of mind and partially justified in reacting to the
circumstances.209 They also argue that the two rationales are not mutually
exclusive, despite this belief in mutual exclusivity being the main reason that
many criminal law scholars are reluctant to consider the two approaches as
compatible.210
This combination theory seems to be a natural fit to bring in evolutionary
analysis as the best background method for fair adjudication. In any case
involving the nineteenth century four,211 some kind of threat is made against
the defendant’s interest.212 In the case of sexual infidelity, a threat is made
against the defendant’s reproductive fitness from actions independent of the
defendant: e.g., the sexual activity of the spouse and a paramour or the seducer
who abandons. The defendant is partially justified because of the threat’s
“natural criminality” against the defendant, and the defendant is partially
excused because of the evolutionarily installed mechanisms in his or her brain
to respond in an emotionally volatile state of mind.
B. The Evolutionary Solution Explained
Heat of passion manslaughter mitigates for the frailty of human nature; this
is a clear endeavor by the law to look into the natural world for guidance. The
discipline of evolutionary psychology seeks to explain what human nature is
by examining the psychological adaptations that the human species has
evolved over the course of thousands of years.213 Who else could the
207

Id. at 1065–66.
Id.
209 Id. (“Hence the provocation defense’s dual requirements of heat of passion and adequate provocation:
they ensure the defense is available only to those defendants whose killing was both partially excused—
because it occurred in heat of passion—and partially justified—because it was in response to adequate
provocation.”).
210 Id. at 1079 (“A great deal of mistaken thinking about provocation has flowed from insufficient
attention being paid to the difference between the claim that the complete defenses are mutually exclusive and
the claim that the partial defenses are mutually exclusive.”).
211 See Note, supra note 6, at 1024.
212 Id.
213 PINKER, supra note 104, at 107; John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, Conceptual Foundations of
Evolutionary Psychology, in THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 85, at 5, 5.
208
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(universally) reasonable person be but a person responding in predictable ways
by engaging psychological programming that is shared by humanity?
If the law mitigates for homicidal rage that manifests from one
evolutionary adaption that addresses a severe threat to reproductive fitness for
one sex, then it should mitigate for all adaptations that are a member of that set
of threats because the law professes to apply equally to all persons.214 The
male’s strong jealousy response to sexual infidelity is one of several strong
emotional responses evolved by humans—of both sexes—over the course of
thousands of years to avoid severe damage to fitness.215 To apply fairly to all
individuals, the law should mitigate murder to manslaughter whenever a
defendant is provoked by a severe threat to his or her reproductive fitness. It is
very predictable which fact patterns would fit within the evolutionary standard;
thus, the evolutionary solution remedies the problem of normativity in the
MPC and alternative approaches216 because the court can determine, in
advance, which situations confronted the defendant with a severe threat to
reproductive fitness. It has already done so in the case of sexual infidelity, and
it should expand its mitigation to the entirety of the set of threats against
reproductive fitness. When a woman is seduced by a lover and then abandoned
(e.g., Moriarty), her fitness is greatly damaged by the seducer because he took
advantage of her reproductive capability without providing the support she is
wired to desire. That deserves mitigation—but not exoneration—which this
standard would provide.
The Moriarty scenario is certainly not limited to the 1800s. In a recent
incident, a woman killed a romantic rival while confronting her ex-boyfriend
for not helping raise their baby.217 The Chicago Tribune reported that the
suspect confronted her ex-boyfriend as he left a convenience store and sprayed
him with mace.218 Because the ex-boyfriend could no longer drive, his current
girlfriend got out of the car to move to the driver’s seat.219 The defendant
began fighting with her as well and stabbed her several times, killing her.220
The influx of emotion in this tragic scenario is not surprising: the woman,
abandoned with her offspring by the man, was amidst her deserting lover and

214
215
216
217
218
219
220

Cf. 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1139 (2005).
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part I.B–C.
Christy Gutowski, Woman Charged in Stabbing Death, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 2011, at C5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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his new girlfriend. Under an evolutionary scheme, the question of
manslaughter mitigation would certainly go to the jury in this case.
By looking at damage to one’s fitness under the partial excuse perspective,
we can determine how cognitively distressing the specific provocation was to
the defendant and whether it actually pushed the defendant into a predictably
volatile state of mind. And under the partial justification aspect of the
mitigation, the court can determine which individuals will fall within the range
of potential victims that would allow mitigation because of their involvement
in the provocation (e.g., adulterers, paramours, and seducers). Beyond these
categories, homicides against other victims will not be mitigated (e.g.,
bystanders). For example, exiting a marriage that did not produce children
would not be as distressing to the reasonable man as walking in on his spouse
engaging in sexual infidelity. Looking at the number of evolutionary
challenges faced by the defendant at the time of the homicide can create a
normative and systematic test with a clear scope. It permits the court to
determine whether the individual killed under the heat of passion and whether
the deceased falls within the range of “acceptable” victims.221
One issue that arises with evolutionary analysis is the apparent sexism
permeating this formula. Evolutionary theory embraces sex differences in a
way that the law usually wants to avoid.222 The immediately obvious problem
is that men will tend to have homicides mitigated for one set of circumstances
(e.g., sexual infidelity) while women will have homicides they commit
mitigated for other circumstances (e.g., seduction and abandonment or
stalking). The sociological level of analysis that invokes a difference among
the sexes in the actual application is inappropriate and is not the standard
advocated by this Comment. The different sexes will have their homicides
mitigated for the same reason under the same standard—the defendant
experienced a severe threat against his or her reproductive fitness. The crimes
are mitigated when they result from the same set of threats; because the
formula is the same and simply invoked by different trends in maleness and
femaleness, it should not be regarded as sexist. Both sexes are provided the
same opportunity for mitigation that the other has. A woman who kills as a
response to sexual infidelity should still receive mitigation, even though that
may not be a quintessentially female response, and vice versa for men.

221

This Comment readily admits that victimization is never actually acceptable.
Cf. 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1139 (2005) (“[I]n the absence of some valid reason to the
contrary, men and women similarly situated must be treated equally under the law.”).
222
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This solution confronts the issue of suddenness. At common law, the
homicide must have been committed suddenly “before a reasonable time for
the passion to cool;”223 the Model Penal Code does not have such a
requirement.224 The evolutionary solution does not seem to have an obvious
answer to this question. However, it seems that a standard incorporating a
suddenness requirement would be preferable. The longer the time between
provocation and killing, the more difficult it will be to determine whether the
defendant acted while in a volatile state of mind or whether the defendant
deliberately acted retributively against the provoker. While the evolutionary
solution advocates that the crime should be mitigated because it falls within the
scope of threats against reproductive fitness, it still maintains that the
defendant must have acted while in a volatile state of mind. The reaction just
has to be predictable under evolutionary analysis.
Along the same vein is the issue of homosexual relationships. Threats
against reproductive fitness seem inapplicable because homosexual activity
cannot result in reproduction. However, this is rather easily addressed.
Homosexual individuals still possess the same neurological machinery as their
heterosexual counterparts, and thus the law should treat homosexual
relationships the same way.225 This issue opens up the distinction between
proximate cause and ultimate cause. The proximate cause of an organism’s
adaptation is the reason that organism behaves in a certain way (e.g., the sex
drive causing sexual behavior); the ultimate cause of an adaptation is the
evolutionary reason the organism adapted at all (e.g., evolving the sex drive to
encourage activity that leads to successful reproduction). The ultimate cause is

223 Williams v. State, 675 So. 2d 537, 541 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (quoting ALA. CODE § 13A-6-3(a)(2)
(1975)). Related to imminence, a major roadblock experienced by defendants committing homicide related to
the battered woman’s syndrome is that the killing did not occur while the defendant was under an imminent
threat. The evolutionary solution does not speak to the issue of homicides related to battered woman’s
syndrome. This analytical approach addresses psychological mechanisms present in human nature for
universal situations that can befall any person at any time because of the machinery making up the psyche. The
battered woman’s syndrome is derived from a special kind of relationship that results in the dynamics between
two specific people and the particular interaction between them and their social situation. See John W. Roberts,
Student Article, Between the Heat of Passion and Cold Blood: Battered Woman’s Syndrome as an Excuse for
Self-Defense in Non-Confrontational Homicides, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 135, 138–42 (2003) (explaining
the nature of battered woman’s syndrome).
224 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
225 DONALD SYMONS, THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 292 (1979). But see Christine R. Harris,
Sexual and Romantic Jealousy in Heterosexual and Homosexual Adults, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 7, 7 (2002)
(comparing heterosexual and homosexual jealousy while also critiquing previous methodological approaches
to discover gender differences in jealousy).
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not the thought present in the human’s mind226 (e.g., Moriarty did not first
think about her reproductive fitness and then decide to become impassioned).
Rather, it is the proximate causation, such as a man reacting passionately
because his spouse committed adultery. He does not reason into being angry
due to the risk of cuckoldry; he is reacting because the mind is designed to
react that way in those circumstances.
Cultural defenses may be inapplicable under this standard, although this
Comment does not take a position. The notion behind a cultural basis for
provocation manslaughter is that the defendant should have his or her homicide
charge mitigated if it was committed in the course of a cultural norm.227 Take
People v. Kimura as an example.228 When the culturally Japanese defendant
learned of her husband’s infidelity, she took her children, clutched in her arms,
and walked into the sea to drown both of them and herself in accordance with
Japanese custom.229 Her children died, but she was rescued; she was charged
with murder.230 This homicide would not be mitigated under an evolutionary
scheme, but perhaps it would be if legislatures enacted cultural protections.
Evolutionary analysis assumes a transcendence of cultures. No matter what
culture a human might be a part of, that person still maintains all of the same
psychological mechanisms that are present in humans everywhere. Crosscultural studies demonstrate the universality of evolutionary adaptations.231
Under an evolutionary standard, culture would not be considered a factor for
mitigation.
The most difficult aspect for the evolutionary perspective is that men are
generally more violent than women,232 so there could likely remain an unequal
frequency in which the mitigation is sought. The question remains whether this
status is desirable, which is not argued here. This Comment posits a fair and
responsive solution to manslaughter mitigation that can apply appropriately to
both sexes and seeks to remove the gender bias from the law by taking the full
range of impassioning circumstances into account.

226 B. Thierry, Integrating Proximate and Ultimate Causation: Just One More Go!, 89 CURRENT SCI.
1180, 1180 (2005).
227 Sing, supra note 18, at 1844–46.
228 Paul Feldman, Mother Pleads No Contest in Drowning of 2 Children, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1985,
Metro pt. 2, at 1.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Buss & Schmitt, supra note 146, at 216–18.
232 See Wilson et al., supra note 118, at 431.
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CONCLUSION
Manslaughter doctrine is neither precise nor concise enough to mitigate the
passionate homicides that it seems to have been designed to address. The
common law is too rigid and reflects only a masculine jealousy response that
evolved to address men’s evolutionary pressures without giving any credence
to the evolutionary challenges of women. The MPC has allowed for an
unwieldy expansion of manslaughter mitigation that would apply to an
enormous range of circumstances with no real systematic approach or
normativity.233 It also permits mitigation for a wide range of provoking
circumstances that would never even be considered by the common law—
perhaps for good reason.
Looking at crimes of passion through the lens of evolutionary psychology,
one can better determine whether a passionate homicide was the result of an
ordinary mechanism installed in the psyche or an aberration based on the
individual’s own personality, preferences, or pathologies.234 Evolutionary
theory predicts that the sudden, visual discovery of sexual infidelity would
provoke a homicidal rage in an ordinary person while it would not likely
predict that an ordinary person who was promised sex one afternoon and then
denied that intercourse would lash out in rage and kill.235 Similarly, the
standard would predict that a woman who is seduced and abandoned would
experience extreme emotional distress that comes from similar evolutionary
concerns that a man does in in flagrante delicto. Utilizing evolutionary
theory—the very discipline that explores the principles of human nature—to
recalibrate manslaughter doctrine will provide the law with a way to
adequately tailor manslaughter to demonstrate the law’s respect for the frailty
of human nature. Indeed, this is because evolutionary theory seeks to

233

Nourse, supra note 11.
While the law does recognize individual frailties, that is not the purview of manslaughter mitigation.
See supra Part I.C. This Comment argues for a manslaughter standard applicable to all persons for their
common humanity.
235 See People v. Fardan, 592 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), aff’d, 628 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1993)
(allowing the question of manslaughter to go to the jury). While it would cause some distress to have one’s
hope dashed, violent aggression would carry too much cost for the reasonable person to be thrown into a
homicidal rage.
234
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explain “the laws upon which human nature is constituted.”236 If the law is
reaching into the world for guidance, evolutionary theory can speak to how to
fairly mitigate.
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